Aristotelian powers : without them, what would modern science do? by Cartwright,  N. & Pemberton,  J.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
24 September 2015
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Cartwright, N. and Pemberton, J. (2013) 'Aristotelian powers : without them, what would modern science
do?', in Powers and capacities in philosophy : the new Aristotelianism. New York: Routledge, pp. 93-112.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://www.routledge.com/9780415889889
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in Powers and Capacities in Philosophy The
New Aristotelianism on 18/12/2012, available online: http://www.routledge.com/9780415889889
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
 - 1 -   AP v9 0             
 
 
Aristotelian powers: Without them, what would 
modern science do? 
 
 
Nancy Cartwright (LSE & UCSD)  
John Pemberton (LSE) 
 
November 2011 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Aristotelian powers, we maintain, are part of the basic ontology of nature – at least 
as nature is pictured through the lens of modern science. We defend these powers 
not on general metaphysical grounds but rather show their importance for making 
sense of contemporary scientific practice1. Powers are the best way to make sense of 
familiar methods for  inferring and testing causal claims in contemporary science, 
from physics to economics; and in particular the use of what Pemberton has dubbed 
‘what-how-that evidence’ (Pemberton, 2011).  
 
Our powers are Aristotelian in that we suppose that what a power does when 
exercised is in the nature of that power. The powers we see at work in contemporary 
science have single outcomes: A different canonical effect implies a different power. 
This means that there may well be a very great many powers in Nature.  
 
The Scientific Revolutionaries made fun of this kind of Aristotleanism:  It seems to 
make a farce of scientific explanation. What makes heavy bodies fall? Gravity. What 
is gravity? That which makes heavy bodies fall. We by contrast embrace the 
proliferation of powers and argue that it neither undermines scientific explanation 
nor detracts from the achievements of science. Gravity does explain why heavy 
bodies fall and gravity is the power to make heavy bodies fall. The achievement of 
Newtonian science was first, in establishing the empirical fact that having a mass2 
confers on a body the power of gravitational attraction and then, in finding the exact 
strength and functional form of the canonical effect: GMm/r2.  
 
                                                 
1
 In developing an account of powers from a consideration of science, we take ourselves to be 
furthering work started by Rom Harré (e.g. Harré and Madden, 1973). 
2
 We have nothing to offer on what properties like mass are. They may be conglomerates of powers or 
perhaps something different from powers that can have some regular associations with powers.  
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Besides this singularity of powers, we are committed to a distinction between the 
‘canonical effect’ of a power and the outcome that actually results. What happens 
when a power exercises depends on the context3. It generally, maybe even always, 
takes what Cartwright has called a ‘nomological machine’ to underwrite casual 
relations (Cartwright, 1999). Nomological machines produce the causal relations 
they do because of the way the exercisings of the various causal powers involved 
combine in the context of the machine to produce changes in the machine 
arrangement4.  
 
Nature produces nomological machines, as illustrated by the neuron in Figure 5. But 
so can we, as with the toilet cistern of Figure 4. So our account shares another of 
Aristotle’s views: that art can help where Nature fails. We can use our knowledge of 
powers to build new nomological machines with new effects. 
 
The focus on the ‘canonical effect’ of a power, which we call its ‘contribution’, is 
important. It matters not only to Nature – it is how Nature produces effects; but to 
us – understanding contributions and how they combine in context is central to how 
we predict what change a nomological machine will produce, how we are able to 
build new machines to produce new results, and how we provide evidence for causal 
claims.  
 
Central to our account is taking change to be a coherent5 process that unfolds 
through time. Here too we side with Aristotle, in opposition to both Hume and more 
recent writers who take change events to be adequately characterised by their start 
and end points alone6.  
 
We shall show how causal relations arise out of the operation of a nomological 
machine. This makes clear why a good account of the machine that would give rise 
to a hypothesized causal relation can provide strong evidence for that causal 
relation. We explicate how the machine arrangement dictates what can happen – it 
has emergent powers which are not to be found in its components. 
 
This account of powers stands in opposition to a view that powers come with a 
detailed profile of the differing manifestations that will occur with a wide range of 
mutual manifestation partners. We outline some concerns about this account, which 
we take to conceal how both nature and we figure out what powers can do in a 
given context. 
 
                                                 
3
 We are thus developing a long-standing thesis of Cartwright concerning the combining of singular 
powers (e.g. Cartwright, 1983, p59). Others also hold powers to be singular, e.g. Lowe (Lowe, 2011). 
Molnar (Molnar, 2003, 12.1.3) and Mumford (Mumford & Anjum, 2011, Ch 2) are, as we understand, 
amongst those to share the thesis that what happens depends on the combining of the exercisings of 
singular powers.  
4
 Our account of the role of the machine arrangement in dictating what can occur when powers 
manifest seems resonant with Molnar’s account of how “non-powers”, such as spatial position and 
orientation, can affect the outcomes of the working of powers (Molnar, 2003, Chapter 10).   
5
 The nature of this coherence is a matter for science. For example, things, at the macroscopic level at 
least, are generally taken to follow a continuous locus of positions through time. 
6
 We shall explore change more fully in later papers. 
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It might be objected that the account of powers we offer does not eliminate the 
need for laws of nature since it still leaves need for rules of combination that are 
independent of the powers in nature. So that unlike some other powers accounts, 
we may not have succeeded in getting governance back in to Nature. We concede 
that this may be so. There may be ways to get rules for combining powers into 
Nature itself in a way that fits a pure powers ontology and there may not. This 
remains work for the future. 
 
2 Making sense of empirical science 
 
2.1 Making sense of the evidence used by science 
 
Cartwright, following JS Mill, originally defended powers in science in order to 
ground the widespread use of the analytic method, especially in physics and 
economics (Cartwright 1989). In both disciplines great efforts are made to 
understand what a cause would produce were it to act alone, with no other causes 
at work. In physics we create ‘ideal’ circumstances in highly controlled experiments. 
In economics we construct ‘idealised models’ to infer what a single cause would 
produce by itself (‘Galilean thought experiments’). In econometrics we estimate 
parameters that represent what a single cause by itself contributes to an overall 
effect. One might naturally suppose the information gained is useless since in the 
practical world no cause ever acts alone. We spend great effort to learn what things 
do in circumstances that rarely if ever occur. Why? 
 
In sciences making use of the analytic method – where classical mechanics is the 
paradigm -- what certain causes produce in isolation is treated as special. It is treated 
as a stable contribution that the cause can be relied on to make whenever it 
exercises properly, where a contribution is stable when it relates to what actually 
occurs in different circumstances in a systematic way. For instance, the total force on 
a mass will always equal the vector sum of the forces produced by all the causes of 
force acting, like the forces of gravity and of electromagnetic attraction and 
repulsion. Contributions from other kinds of powers combine by simple scalar 
addition - others in far more complicated ways – if the science is right.7  
 
This, Cartwright has argued, is hard to make sense of using only regularity laws. But 
it is just what we should expect from powers. Powers have canonical effects; indeed, 
their canonical effects are part of what it is to be that power. The point about a 
power is that that is what it contributes, and it will contribute that whenever the 
power exercises properly. If the power is properly exercised by itself, the canonical 
effect will be what actually occurs. What results when several powers exercise 
together will depend in a systematic way on the canonical effects, or contributions, 
                                                 
7
See Cartwright, 1999, pp 53 -59 for a discussion of other rules of combination.  Pemberton, 2011 
makes clear that the results of the combination will depend heavily on the constrainings, relations, and 
arrangement of the parts with powers, not just on what powers are present.  
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of each. So powers are just what are needed to underwrite the analytic method 
widely used across the sciences.  
 
Here we propose a different kind of scientific practice that powers – and, we 
suggest, powers alone – make sense of, based on Pemberton’s work on what-how-
that evidence.  Modern science uses  three different kinds of evidence in support of 
causal claims: First, evidence encompassing things and their arrangements that bring 
about causal change (what-evidence); second, information about the processes of 
such change (how-evidence); third, the causal regularities that are brought about 
(that-evidence). More Humean accounts don’t seem to allow much of this evidence – 
their ontologies are too parsimonious. They generally can make sense only of that-
evidence, evidence of regularities. 
 
Nomological machines are sufficiently stable arrangements of components and 
capacities or powers (Cartwright, 1999, p49) that can, under suitable circumstances, 
give rise to causal regularities. Nomological machines thus provide a principled basis 
for admitting “what-evidence”.  
 
How-evidence relates to what we call change-processes8 (Pemberton, 2011). 
 
2.2 Nomological machines: machine arrangements and change-
processes 
 
We suppose that the arrangement of powerful particulars in the nomological 
machine can give rise to a process of change involving these particulars. The machine 
arrangement provides the context in which the powers exercise. 
 
The machine arrangement comprises a collection of particulars with properties that 
bring powers with them and other relations that help fix the arrangement, such as 
relative position or orientation. Constrainings are also typically a feature of machine 
arrangements. Examples of constrainings are: a molecular bonding, an interlocking 
of congruent shapes, a bolting together, a hooking together, a tying together (e.g. 
with a string, a tendon), a containing by a boundary (e.g. a cellular wall, a test tube). 
Constrainings impose constraints on the relationships among things. For instance, if 
two objects are enclosed in a spherical container of diameter d, their centres of mass 
must be less than distance d apart. Constrainings are on-going exercisings of powers 
of things in the machine that constrain the change that can occur to these things. 
Constrainings, at the mid-size level at least, often fall within the domain of the 
laboratory technician, the plumber, the carpenter, or other expert in the 
construction of arrangements of things. A piece of string pushed through a hole in a 
                                                 
8
 Our account  of change-processes develops previous ideas of Pemberton (Pemberton, 2011) that 
mesh Cartwright’s account of nomological machines, involving powers and their contributions, with 
features taken from the closely related account of mechanisms by Machamer, Darden, and Craver 
(Machamer et al, 2000), most notably their account of activities. Activities are important for 
understanding what the nomological machine does in changing arrangements from one stage to 
another. 
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bob and then configured into a knot has the power to hold fast to the bob, thus 
producing a constraining. When we tie the other end to a fixed pivot, we create a 
crude pendulum.  
 
We may think of machines as beginning in a start arrangement. When its powers 
exercise, the arrangement may change into a new arrangement, perhaps with new 
powers – and this may change again into another arrangement. Each power 
produces its canonical effect, which is what is in the nature of that power to do. The 
overall change that occurs is the combination of the individual contributions in this 
context. We call this a change-process. 
 
2.3 Examples of nomological machines and their change-processes 
 
The following simple examples illustrate machine arrangements and change-
processes across a range of scientific areas. In each case we show how science 
understands the repeatable change as a process in which a machine arrangement 
changes over time – and these changes are understood as the result of the 
combination of contributions of the individual powers in that specific arrangement. 
2.3.1 Pendulum 
 
Here is a familiar nomological machine: a bob tied by a string to a fixed pivot (near 
the Earth). 
 
Start-
arrangement
End-
arrangement
 
  Figure 1 
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In the start-arrangement the bob is stationary and is released. In the change-
process: the bob, by virtue of its mass, exercises its power to attract and be attracted 
by the Earth; the string exercises its power to pull the bob towards the pivot. The 
bob moves around the arc. There is flexibility in choosing an end-point –the bottom 
of its swing, say.  The arrangement matters: The string could not pull the bob if it 
were not tied to it. 
 
In modelling this situation, the forces due to gravity and the string are estimated as 
separate component forces; these are added to derive the resultant force on the bob 
and thus calculate its future position, velocity, and acceleration. This allows the 
movement of the bob to be neatly summarised, at least approximately, using well 
known equations. A more detailed definition of the change-process might be used, 
e.g. air resistance might figure in the arrangement; its effect is treated as an 
additional component force, and a model of damped oscillation results. For this 
nomological machine, as in many other mechanical examples, our empirical 
knowledge informs us that Nature’s method of combining component powers is 
through vector addition.  And we figure out which forces are added by inspecting the 
arrangement. 
 
2.3.2 Wind pushing a blowable thing 
 
The everyday empirical learning of children and adults in interaction with the world 
also makes use of nomological machines and change-processes.  
 
W
in
d
Start-
arrangement
End-
arrangement
Blowable 
thing
W
in
d
Blowable 
thing
 
  Figure 2 
 
As a small child we may learn to blow toy boats across the bath, or plastic windmills 
to make them spin. Later we may fly kites; we learn to recognise washing on the line 
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or trees being blown about. The change-process story is this: In the relevant 
arrangement, the wind exercises its power to push a blowable thing, and a blowable 
thing exercises its power to catch the wind and move. It is the combination of these 
exercisings of powers in the arrangement that gives rise to the change that occurs. 
We learn that it is in the nature of such winds to push blowable things. Note that the 
power has a single form of contribution. As children learn about the power of a wind 
to push, they are typically able to extrapolate to new situations: to their friend’s toy 
boat, to a leaf floating on their milk. This is consistent with our suggestion that they 
are forming the notion of a single contribution of the power that applies across 
differing contexts. 
 
2.3.3 Hydrogen oxygen explosion 
 
Here is a simple example from chemistry: 
 
O
H
Start-
arrangement
End-
arrangement
H
H H
H
O
H
HH
O
O
 
  Figure 3 
 
Hydrogen and oxygen atoms are initially arranged in bonded pairs. When the gas 
molecules are sparked, the increased excitation of some of these bonded pairs 
causes the individual atoms to break apart. Each hydrogen atom and each oxygen 
atom has the power to take part in the bonding of H²O molecules (and in the 
somewhat complex and dynamic bonding that occurs in collections of such 
molecules, i.e. in water). As the hydrogen and oxygen atoms exercise their individual 
powers to bond to form H²O molecules, energy is released which excites further 
molecules. Again, more detail might be included in the change-process story if 
desired, e.g. explicitly including the energy, its form, and its quantified amount.  
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2.3.4 Toilet cistern 
 
Here is an engineering example: 
 
 
  Figure 4 
 
An account of the change-process might go like this:  
 
When the handle (flush control) is turned, the lever arm (which has the 
power to pull up the lift rod) pulls up the lift rod (which has the power to 
open the outlet valve) which opens the outlet valve (which has the power to 
release water from the cistern), which releases water from the cistern, which 
lowers the ball-cock, which opens the inlet valve,… 
 
This is a nicely sequenced exercising of powers that makes transparent the sense in 
which the powers of each of the component parts work together in the machine 
arrangement to produce a change-process – the release of a flush of water and the 
refilling of the cistern.  
 
2.3.5 Synaptic transmission 
 
Typically examples from the biosciences are more complex since the relevant 
machine arrangements are more complex.  
 
 - 9 -   AP v9 0             
 
  Figure 5 
 
Here the story that biologists tell includes the movement along axons of action 
potentials, potential differences across the membrane that have the power to open 
sodium selective gates in the neuron wall, and how these open gates have the power 
to admit clouds of sodium ions into the neuron. As in our other examples, such 
stories tell how change arises from the machine arrangement as a result of the 
exercise of powers of the components, where the change occurs to the arrangement 
of the machine. 
 
2.4 Evidence from the repeat operation of nomological machines 
 
Empirical science is centrally concerned with machine arrangements and processes 
that are repeatable9. Repeatability allows evidence to be amassed to meet the 
demanding epistemic hurdles typical of empirical science. To obtain such repeat 
evidence, science focuses on type-level change-processes and type-level machine 
arrangements. 
 
2.4.1 Science’s focus on repeatability 
 
The repeatability of experiments is at the core of scientific method. When we set up 
our physics or chemistry experiment in the right way, the method requires that we 
be able to reproduce the designated outcomes. In the biosciences the beating of a 
heart, the depolarisation of a neuron, and a vast number of other biological 
                                                 
9
 Although one-off change-processes are also often interesting, e.g. in crime investigation and history. 
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processes repeat. It is this repeatability that allows the study of these processes and 
of the structures that take part. Such studies form a central activity of bioscience, as 
documented in the subject’s text books and journal articles.  
 
The engineer, too, takes repeatability to be central – machines they design and build 
are expected repeatedly to produce a change-process sufficiently reliably, e.g. 
cisterns to flush, toasters to toast bread, lasers to lase. In everyday empirical 
learning repeatability is also central. Teaching our child to blow a toy boat across the 
bath assumes that repeating the blowing on future bath nights will achieve similar 
results.  
 
But what does such repeatability amount to? Each token process just occurs once – 
it is not repeatable. Repeatability requires the type-identification of token change-
processes with a change-process-type. 
 
2.4.2 Type-level change-processes 
 
When we identify a type of change-process as repeatable, we pick out some type of 
start-arrangement that dictates the change-process-type that can occur, thus fixing 
what can happen. The repeatability of the change-process, the sequenced exercising 
of powers arising from this type of start-arrangement, provides empirical evidence of 
how the relevant powers exercise and combine in this context. Typically, this 
evidence is complemented by prior knowledge of the relevant powers and their 
exercisings. In the case of man-made machines, it is this prior knowledge of powers 
that allows the design engineer to design the machine in the first place, putting the 
parts together in just the right way to produce the required change-process.  
 
2.4.3 Nomological machines with repeat operability underwrite causal 
regularities, i.e. “that evidence” 
 
This account of repeatable change-processes allows us to provide a more detailed 
account of how nomological machines underwrite causal regularities, typically taken 
to be laws of nature, and thus explicate more precisely the relationship between 
“that evidence”, i.e. evidence about the occurrence and features of causal 
regularities, and the nomological machine’s what-how evidence. Here is a picture of 
a nomological machine producing a causal regularity. 
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Set of start-
arrangements
Set of end-
arrangements
Regularities occur amongst aspects of start-arrangements, 
change-processes and end-arrangements
Set of change-
processes (of 
same change-
process-type )
Nomological 
machine
 
  Figure 6 
 
The start-arrangements of the nomological machine can give rise to change-
processes of some change-process-type. Causal regularities summarise facts about 
relations between posited “causes” and “effects”. These causes and effects are 
selected aspects of the start-arrangements, change-processes (e.g. taken to be 
events), and end-arrangements10. Examples of causal regularities are: 
 
 the pulling of the chain (an aspect of the start-arrangement) is followed by a 
flushing (an aspect of the change-process) 
 the explosion of hydrogen and oxygen (a change-process) produces water (an 
aspect of the end-arrangement 
 
The nomological machine is real and the change-processes are real. The causal 
regularities are derivative from the repeat operation of the machine - they are real 
but epi-phenomenal.  
 
2.5 Nomological machines with change-processes make sense of 
what-how-that evidence 
 
How-evidence arises from the change-process, the production of the end-
arrangement out of the start-arrangement via the combining of the contributions of 
the powers exercised in the context of the machine arrangement. Nomological 
machines with their change-processes thus allow us to make sense of the full range 
                                                 
10
 The adoption of a discrete time step here should be recognised as an explicatory device – in practice 
change processes interlink through continuous time.  
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of empirical evidence types used to support causal claims in empirical science:  
“what-how-that” evidence.  
 
The following table illustrates the main evidence types with reference to the 
example of a toilet cistern. 
 
Example: cistern flush Evidence-type What-how-
that 
Toilet flushes when chain is pulled Regular association of 
“cause” and “effect” 
That 
Presence of machine – i.e. 
arrangement of components inside 
cistern (outlet valve, ball-cock, etc.)  
Presence of machine (i.e. 
arrangement of  
components) 
What 
Outlet valve can release water, rod can 
pull open outlet valve, etc. 
Components have suitable 
powers 
What 
The chain is securely hooked to one 
end of the lever; the lifting rod is 
bolted to the other end of the lever.  
Constrainings are suitably 
implemented 
What 
Pulling of chain is followed by release 
of water and opening of inlet valve, 
then refilling of tank 
Correctly sequenced 
occurrence of start, 
intermediate, and end 
arrangements  
How 
Rod experiences stress when cistern 
flush operates just when and how we 
anticipate (e.g. along its length, of 
credible strength)  
Evidence of exercise of 
power 
How 
 
 
When we pull the chain the toilet flushes – a nice causal regularity, “that evidence”. 
And when we open the cistern lid we discover the presence of the machine 
responsible – a suitable arrangement of components that gives rise to a flush 
process. From our prior knowledge of plumbing, or perhaps by investigating the 
operation of this machine, we come to recognise what each component can do in 
this arrangement – the relevant powers of each component. We can look to see 
what constrainings are in place – e.g. the chain is hooked to one end of the lever; the 
lifting rod is bolted to the other end. These constrainings are consistent with the 
change-process we expect and with the ability of the machine to repeatedly 
instantiate the required start-arrangement. And when we pull the chain, we have 
evidence of the operation of the machine – the sequenced occurrence of start, 
intermediate, and end-arrangements of the components over a timescale and 
following a pattern we expect in light of the change-process-type, i.e. the flush 
process.  
 
Does pulling the chain really open the outlet valve? Perhaps we are suspicious. We 
might attach a device to the connecting rod to measure stress. We find that the rod 
experiences stress just when we would expect given our characterisation of the 
change-process, and with credible magnitude and in the direction expected (i.e. 
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along its length). This provides additional evidence of the exercise of the relevant 
power. 
 
The “what” evidence (the presence of a machine with suitable powers) and “how” 
evidence (the sequenced occurrence of the start, intermediate, and end-
arrangements together with evidence of the exercise of the powers consistent with 
the change-process-type) adds to our regularity “that” evidence (the flushing of the 
toilet whenever the chain is pulled) to provide what-how-that evidence of causal 
regularities in the world. 
 
Empirical science uses all three kinds of evidence and looks for all three kinds of 
understanding - the more the better. 
 
2.6 How nomological machines and change-processes make sense of 
scientific methods 
 
Many of the core activities of successful empirical science may be characterised, in 
terms of nomological machines and their associated powers ontology, as one of the 
following:  
 
1. The identification of an arrangement of things in the world (i.e. some 
nomological machine arrangement), and the prediction of the near-future of 
these things (e.g. the future position of some planetary system, the arrival of a 
flush shortly after the chain is pulled).  
2. The construction of an arrangement of things, including their constrainings, so as 
to control the local near-future (e.g. setting up some repeatable experiment in 
the laboratory; building toasters, computers, lasers, and other machines we plan 
to use in the world).  
3. The intervention on some arrangement of things engaged in a change-process so 
as to amend the likely outcome (e.g. applying fertiliser to a field of crops, the 
application to a neuron of a ‘tetanus’, a high frequency train of stimuli that can 
induce long-tem potentiation (e.g. Craver, 2007, 3.2)). 
 
Our empirical methods can also be understood as concerned with building 
knowledge of powers: knowledge of markers for the power, i.e. properties of things 
that carry the power (perhaps their microstructure, shape, or other feature, like 
mass), that tell us if the power is present; knowledge of the contribution the power 
produces; and knowledge of how contributions combine in change-processes in 
different types of machine arrangement.  
 
To make use of such knowledge in a real world context, the sciences – and 
engineering – typically characterise the context as being of some machine 
arrangement type with which we are already familiar. We pick out some discrete 
collection of things and their properties, and certain of their powers, that we take to 
be relevant to some aspect of the near future of the context that is of interest. We 
then use qualitative and perhaps quantitative knowledge of the component powers 
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together with knowledge of how they combine in this context to estimate the 
changes that will occur.  
 
These methods of predicting or controlling the future are, everyone agrees, 
defeasible. As Anscombe notes, “Causation is not to be identified with 
necessitation,” (Anscombe, 1981, p136). We may agree that the hitting of a cricket 
ball by the batsman in a certain way caused it to reach the boundary. But if a ball, hit 
in just the same way, collides with a hapless woodpigeon at mid-off, then the 
boundary may not be reached. Omitting local things from our start-arrangement, in 
this case the woodpigeon, limits our predictive reliability. More typically, wind, rain, 
humidity, insects, etc. will vary the exact flight of the ball, so that an initial prediction 
that omits these is inexact.  
 
In contexts where we have a high degree of control, such as the laboratory (or where 
we are lucky, such as astronomy), the effect of omitted factors on our predictions 
may be limited. In the blousy world of cricket balls, our predictions are typically less 
accurate. In any case, focussing on some discrete collection of features implies the 
omission of others that have some, hopefully lesser, relevance. Sometimes, at least, 
we can assess the likely degree of variation from our estimates to inform our 
strategy. 
 
These methods for predicting make good sense given our powers/machine ontology 
in which Nature fixes   the overall outcome by combining the individual contributions 
in the machine arrangement. Even better, our knowledge of component powers and 
how they operate under various constraints empowers us to make predictions about 
new arrangements – to design new machines and to predict what will happen in 
changed circumstances. 
 
2.8 What powers do that laws can’t 
 
This depends on what the laws are about. We have no quarrel with the claim that 
there are general truths connecting powers with features that ensure the presence 
of those powers. Having a mass brings with it the power to attract other masses; 
having the structure and components of a toilet cistern brings with it the power to 
flush water when the chain is pulled.  
 
Hume taught that it makes no sense to distinguish between the obtaining of a power 
and its exercise. There are just, first, the features that, as we would have it, ensure 
the presence of the power and, second, the overall effect. We disagree. Our account 
is a powers account precisely because we take exercisings seriously as a central part 
of scientific ontology. When a power is exercised11, its canonical effect is produced. 
                                                 
11
  Perhaps we should say ‘exercised without interference’. Can the power be exercised without the 
canonical effect occurring? For example, can the power to move another body closer be exercised 
without the other body being pulled? Maybe something prevents the pull despite the exercising? 
Although many metaphysicians allow for this, we have not discovered cases in the sciences where this 
happens. 
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This often differs dramatically from the overall effect that occurs. So the powers 
ontology distinguishes three distinct occurrences: 
 the obtaining of the power 
 the exercising of the power, which we here take to be synonymous with the 
canonical effect or ‘contribution’ 
 the obtaining of the overall effect. 
 
Having a mass ensures that a system has the power to move another system with 
mass towards it. In ordinary language, the first mass pulls the second even if the 
second does not move. Pulling is exercising the power to move another object 
closer, and that’s just what it sounds like. One can relabel this with a different term – 
like ‘the obtaining of the force due to gravity’. But that does not turn it from an 
exercising of a power into an event that should get admitted in a Humean ontology.   
 
And we certainly have no quarrel with this relabeling. To the contrary, we argue that 
a central part of what science does – and should do—is to discover what powers 
exist in Nature and what ways there are of identifying when these powers obtain. 
For example, discovering the power to pull other bodies closer with precisely a 
strength of attraction GMm/r2 and discovering that having a mass will ensure the 
presence of this power. This very specific power characterized by its precise 
canonical effect will naturally need a new, technical label.  
 
Sometimes those who advocate an anti-powers or Humean ontology seem to 
suppose that if it’s a technical scientific concept, and especially if it can figure in an 
equation, then it doesn’t have to do with powers. Science at base deals with 
quantities that take values at space-time points, we are told. Suppose we agree. That 
doesn’t do away with powers. For many of these quantities, like mass, science deals 
with them just because  it has discovered that these quantities bring with them 
powers we have identified to obtain in Nature; others, like ‘the force due to gravity’, 
because they name exercisings. You may, in an attempt at a Humean space-time 
description, fail to mention what exercisings happen where and when, describing 
only the overall effects instead, like the ‘total force’. But that does not mean that 
these exercisings are not there in the scientific image despite your failure to mention 
them. It is just by understanding  what these canonical contributions are, that we – 
and Nature – figure out what the overall effect will be when a mix of powers are 
exercised together in a specific arrangement. 
 
Suppose instead, in Humean fashion, that Nature does not have these canonical 
effects to look to. She has only laws that connect starting features and overall 
effects, which we shall suppose for the sake of argument may have nothing to do 
with powers. What must these laws look like if Nature is to consult them as to what 
is to happen in the sorts of real arrangements of things that we have been 
discussing, such as the set-ups in laboratories for repeatable experiments or the 
layout of the parts of a machine capable of repeat operability? To do the job these 
laws must be complex indeed.  
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Consider the toilet cistern in John’s bathroom. When John pulls the chain, the lever 
turns pulling up the lifting rod that pulls open the outlet valve releasing water to 
flow and push against the flanges of the valve to open it further. The laws that 
dictate what happens must reflect the exact shapes, arrangement, and constrainings 
of each of the parts. They must allow too for the perishing in the rubber seal, the 
temperature of each of the parts, the temperature gradients around the water in the 
tank, the turning moment of the water and its other internal flows, the vibrations 
from the passing bus, the gravitational effects of sufficiently local objects e.g. the 
Moon, electro-magnetic effects on the water due to local cables, and no doubt 
millions more such factors. And they must be exact in each case.  
 
Our objection here is just like that we will make to the causal profile account that 
identifies a power with what it does in every single possible circumstance. There are 
way too many of these and they are way too complex.  
 
Sometimes the ‘laws only’ theorist pretends that this superinfinitude of laws are all 
instances of some finite set of simple laws. That has two drawbacks. First, the usual 
one: This is a huge promissory note. In areas we and others have looked at – the 
physics of lasers or superconductors, the use of economics theory in auctions for the 
airwaves, or the construction of everyday machines – we have never seen this work. 
In many cases there is good reason to think it can’t work, and in many others, no 
obvious way to set about doing it. 
 
Second, it sweeps big issues about arrangements under the rug. If a bunch of forces 
are present together, the question of arrangement seems not to come up. They just 
add by vector addition. But what if you have a lever, a valve, a pulley and some 
flanges? Do you get a toilet cistern? Or…? The canonical effect of a lever combines 
differently with that of a pulley depending on what arrangement they are in. What 
kind of finite set of simple laws will encode the infinitude of possibilities? Perhaps 
there is one that can. But why think so? Mere metaphysical prejudice against powers 
is not a very convincing reason. Which brings us to our basic objections to laws, both 
the small set of simple ones and the superinfinity of super complex ones. 
 
These laws are unnecessary. We do not consult such laws to make predictions nor to 
build devices that work as we want. We consult our knowledge of what features 
bring what powers with them and of how these achieve what overall effect in 
specific arrangements. Why should we not suppose it is just what Nature does? After 
all, if the information is there for us, surely it is there for Nature too. 
 
Finally these laws, even if they exist somewhere for Nature to consult, are not very 
helpful for us. On the laws picture, successful scientific descriptions of what happens 
in specific circumstances supply a set of highly detailed laws covering specific 
situations. How are we to use this to construct knowledge about what will happen in 
other situations? In the powers ontology, the powers of things in their specific 
arrangements are there in the actual situation. They are what Nature looks to to 
settle what should happen next. And they are what we look to to achieve the 
outcomes we aim for.  
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We design situations to have suitable arrangements of things, powers, constrainings 
and shieldings so that the powers we wish to dominate the overall outcome do so. 
We necessarily omit many things, powers, and details of the actual arrangement, 
Often this turns out to work: The contribution to the overall outcome from the 
omissions is sufficiently small. Sometimes it is not. Now we must redesign, adjust or 
mend and try again. When the arrangements work as expected, this provides 
evidence about the operation of the powers in this context – and we build our 
knowledge of powers, the things that ground them, and what the powers do in 
various types of situation by bootstrapping from such evidence. 
 
The laws theorist would no doubt like to adopt some similar story to argue that 
empirical evidence for our complex change-processes provides evidence for those 
simple laws they like so much. This is just what we have argued is difficult to justify. 
But even were the laws theorist to succeed in developing an account that does not 
appeal to powers, their putative laws would surely accord with the findings of 
current science – they could be neatly summarised in powers talk. Perhaps then the 
laws theorist might pro tem proceed as if the powers account of science were 
correct, whilst retaining a belief that powers are merely talk. But this would already 
acknowledge the practical accuracy of a powers account for making sense of the 
strategies of modern science, especially the use of “what” and “how” evidence.  
 
We adopt powers on just such pragmatic grounds, rather than on any metaphysical 
basis – science in practical interface with the world makes do with powers. So why 
posit laws that cover every possible case and maintain faith that this approach can 
one day be empirically justified? As Mumford notes, laws are themselves 
metaphysically extravagant (Mumford, 2004) – surely parsimony dictates that we 
give up a laws account, at least until it can be better justified. Powers provide a 
coherent ontology that makes sense of the practice of science. Laws as yet do not – 
and there seems little reason to suppose they will do so any time soon. 
 
3 Some concerns with a causal profile account of powers  
 
Our examples show how science calculates overall outcomes by combining separate 
contributions from distinct powers in a specific arrangement. This is what motivates 
our Aristotelian account in which powers have a single canonical effect: One power, 
one contribution. It is in the nature of the power to produce just that contribution. 
This account is likely to be troubling to metaphysicians who favour a profile account 
of powers, on which, roughly, a power is characterized by a causal profile. A causal 
profile can be represented as a set of ordered pairs, where the first member of each 
pair is a set of mutual manifestation partners, and the second member is the 
manifestation that can occur when the associated manifestation partners obtain. In 
deterministic cases, when the first member of the pair obtains, the second (the 
manifestation) is supposed to obtain as well; in the case of probabilistic causality, the 
latter obtains with a certain probability; and perhaps even erratic operation can be 
allowed, where the manifestation obtains sometimes, but with no fixed probability. 
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Since the manifestation partners are themselves properties/powers (in the varying 
senses proposed by different accounts), on this metaphysics, the causal profiles that 
define the different powers that exist in the world must all be consistent. 
 
We have a number of worries about this account:  
 
1. The causal powers seem to be analyzed away by the conditionals that can be read 
off from their causal profiles. Of course, if you identify properties as just 
conglomerates of powers, you can say that both the antecedents and the 
consequents of these conditionals are causal powers. Still, the whole story doesn’t 
look much different from when you don’t say that. So this looks too much like 
analysing powers away into conditionals to count as a robust powers account. 
 
2. One of the central lessons we take from science is that arrangement matters. 
Some metaphysicians talk as if arrangements are just another member of the set of 
mutual manifestation partners. We don’t see how to make sense of this. 
Alternatively, the first member of the ordered pair could be, not a set, but a total 
situation – i.e. different causal interferences, linkages, etc imply different situations. 
But this does not seem to clarify how arrangement is to be managed within the 
profile.  
 
3. For many properties the causal profile will be ‘dense’: It will have the cardinality of 
the real number line, or higher. Distance r and mass m seem to be mutual 
manifestation partners with M in producing a force contribution GMm/r2 and that 
will be true for all values of r and of m, across the two continua.  
 
4. Since there is no mention of contributions, it looks as if the second member of a 
pair in the causal profile will be the overall outcome. But then we must admit not 
just uncountably many items in the causal profile, but the causal profile is also totally 
open-ended and indefinite. In favour of our view, there is at least a recognizable 
pattern to what would be the causal profiles for separate singular causal powers. For 
instance, for the power of gravitational attraction that objects of mass m always 
have, the first member of the ordered pair is always a mass a distance r away; the 
second, always a (component) force GMm/r2. But there’s no system to the features 
of the first members of causal profile pairs when the second member is the overall 
result (in our example, the ‘resultant force’). A mass m can get itself into any 
arrangement with any number of masses and charges.  Moreover, of this vast 
undisciplined set of features that occur as first members in the profile of the causal 
powers that the sciences study, it would seem that the ones that are instantiated are 
generally a set of measure zero.  
 
5. It seems as though powers do not emerge at higher levels, but are prewritten into 
the (necessarily consistent) causal profiles of each of the components. It is not clear 
how to avoid the implication that all causal powers must be written in to the causal 
profile of some putative lowest level things, and that these profiles then encompass 
all the possibilities of the Universe. 
 
 - 19 -   AP v9 0             
4 The emergence of powers and things 
 
On the account of causal powers that we draw from science, each power has a single 
canonical contribution and rules of composition of various sorts apply. The causal 
power that results from a specific machine arrangement, e.g. a toilet cistern, comes 
in to existence when the arrangement comes into existence. It is not there lying 
dormant in the causal profile of all the constituent parts, along with non-
denumerable infinities of ones that will never obtain. When a token start-
arrangement gives rise to a token change-process, this token start-arrangement has 
the power to produce this token change-process – this power emerges just when the 
start-arrangement is put together.  
 
Such start-arrangements may be temporary and one-off. A one-off arrangement 
supports a causal relation between the token start-arrangement, change-process, 
and end-arrangement, or between some chosen aspects of these tokens, but not a 
broader regularity. 
 
Where a machine arrangement, or some part of an arrangement, remains coherent 
through time (e.g., where the constrainings are sufficient to maintain an on-going 
arrangement of some of the components), we typically recognise this on-going 
coherent arrangement as a thing, e.g. a pendulum, a kite, a toilet cistern, a neuron, a 
diamond carbon-lattice. Such things may support the repeated instantiation of some 
start-arrangement type.  
 
In a repeatable process, start-arrangements of the right type to gives rise to this kind 
of process exhibit the power to produce a change-process of this type. Where a 
thing-type supports the repeated instantiation of such a start-arrangement-type, 
things of this type possess the relevant power, e.g. a pendulum can oscillate, a kite 
can fly, a cistern can flush, a neuron can fire, a diamond can scratch glass. 
 
This account ascribes powers to things that are themselves sufficiently stable 
arrangements of other things. We do not restrict the ascription of powers to 
components, and we avoid speculation about whether there are basic powers from 
which all else derive. 
 
This conclusion has major implications for debates about levels and about reduction. 
The arrangement of parts is immanent in the whole but not in each of the parts. 
Machine arrangements can have emergent powers not possessed by each of the 
parts. This is only likely to seem troubling if we pay insufficient attention to the role 
of the machine arrangement in dictating how singular powers may combine. This 
account of singular powers and their combination lends support to the autonomy of 
the special sciences and provides a challenge to reductionism. 
 
As we acknowledged above, this account of powers leaves the need for some 
account of composition. Perhaps component powers come with rules for what will 
be produced overall when they act in combination in specific arrangements with 
other successfully exercised powers. But this seems unnecessarily complicated. 
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Consider by analogy: Each of us having a rule for calculating what we would do 
should we get together seems far more efficient than each of us having built in a 
dense set of predetermined outcomes for ‘all’ of the indeterminate situations we 
might possibly encounter. We leave this as future work. 
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